2 His lawyer's unsuccessful argument-that taking "only photocopies, not original documents" should not be criminal 3 -prompted this paper.
When tangible property is taken, owners retain nothing. When documents or equivalents are duplicated, however, even if owners retain originals, they suffer loss of control and may lose substantial present and potential advantages, not necessarily economic. Civil redress for such losses has therefore long been available through copyright and trade secret laws. Indeed, it has often been available when injuries occasioned by unauthorized * Mr. Field, an unaffiliated scholar, was a founding faculty member of Franklin Pierce Law Center, as well as the founding Editor-in-Chief of RISK, the predecessor of the University of New Hampshire Law Review. As a full-time professor, he taught intellectual property courses for more than 40 years. He continues as the featured op-ed columnist of iP Frontline. Nearly 100 of his columns are linked from http://www.ipfrontline.com/aboutsource.aspx?editorid=244 (visited June 10, 2013).
1. "The butler did it" has been called "the biggest cliché in mystery writing" and is "commonly attributed to Mary Roberts Rinehart. reproduction seem unrelated to goals traditionally advanced by either body of law. 4 Thus, the way information is expressed may be protected by copyright and, until published, if it otherwise qualifies, information as such may also enjoy trade secret protection. 5 When civil remedies are inadequate to deter theft and vindicate interests of owners and the public, civil remedies can be augmented with criminal penalties. 6 Differences between tangibles and intangibles, however, are often seen to warrant different prosecutorial requirements and penalties.
The second part of this paper explains how federal courts, recognizing those differences, have come to find the National Stolen Property Act ("NSPA") 7 inapplicable to theft of at least some intangibles. Ones addressed there fall within the scope of the Federal Copyright Act ("FCA") 8 and the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 ("EEA").
9
State copyright jurisdiction is mostly preempted, 10 so the third part of the paper focuses on state trade secret laws. It begins by noting that sources of civil trade secret law are nearly uniform whereas criminal law varies in important respects. Three noteworthy opinions then illustrate diverse state approaches. In one, the highest court in Massachusetts refuses to subject intangible property theft to provisions designed for tangible property. 11 In a second, an intermediate Florida appellate court endorses penalties for theft of both intangibles and tangibles where the overwhelming bulk of value resided in the former and the latter was subject to penalties three times larger. 12 In the third opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirms conviction for theft of intangibles in circumstances very much akin to those of concern to the Vatican tribunal in that only copies were stolen.
13
The paper concludes, first, by echoing a suggestion that lack of uniformity in state law justifies federal penalties and expanded jurisdiction.
14 It also advocates more uniformity and better articulation of the subject matter 4. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (alleging infringement of copyright in two sets of works and misappropriation of trade secrets in one set "which it alleges has been the subject of elaborate security measures").
5. contemplated by the term "intangibles" in, for example, the Model Penal Code. 15 Finally, the paper argues that even when tangibles such as media are taken, courts should, for example, not base their value on the value of its intangible contents.
II. FEDERAL LAW A. Copyrights
The FCA contains a key provision, unfortunately buried deeply:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 37 Thus, the portion of the statute most relevant here was amended to read:
(1) In general.-Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was committed-(A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; (B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000 [.] 38 It might seem a stretch to apply copyright law to documents such as the papal papers, ones not intended for public exposure, much less reproduction and sale, but religious organizations have, indeed, obtained relief in similar circumstances. 39 Although copies neither intended for sale, nor sold, have no "retail" value in the hands of owners, the value to transferees would be expected to satisfy the requirement.
B. Trade Secrets
Although federal law provides no civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, prosecutors may seek penalties under the EEA. 40 Unless theft serves foreign interests, 41 however, stolen secrets must be "related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce."
42 That would cover most trade secret theft, but a recent case involving a former employee of Goldman Sachs & Company ("Goldman") illuminates a serious gap. 43 After Sergey Aleynikov, a former Goldman employee, was indicted for theft of trade secrets in violation of the EEA, transporting stolen property in violation of NSPA, and unauthorized computer access under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 44 he moved to dismiss each of these counts.
45
Aleynikov prevailed on the third because, although access was abused, the government conceded that it was authorized. 46 He was subsequently convicted under the NSPA and EEA for theft of proprietary computer source code, 47 but the Second Circuit reversed both.
48
The NSPA conviction was reversed based in part on U.S. v. Bottone, 49 a Second Circuit opinion that upholds a conviction under the NSPA despite the fact that, as claimed in the Vatican case, 50 purloined media were copies, not originals. 51 The force of that part of the case is, however, weakened because the stolen cultures of microorganisms that clearly qualified as goods also moved in commerce, indeed, to Italy. 52 Although the jury had not been asked to determine whether the cultures as well as the photocopies and the like had met the $5000 statutory threshold, 53 the court seems to believe that it would have so found if asked. Moreover, it dismisses the significance of the threshold, saying: "The only reason for the $5,000 limitation is to avoid overtaxing the Department of Justice. There is no legitimate interest of (defendants) . . . which the Congress sought to protect by this requirement."
We have not the slightest question that the jury would have properly convicted on all counts if only the transportation of cultures had been charged, and the papers had been relied on simply as demonstrating the scope of the criminal enterprise and as enhancing the value of the microorganisms. 54 That aside, Bottone says, "where no tangible objects were ever taken or transported, a court would be hard pressed to conclude that 'goods' had been stolen and transported within the meaning of 2314." 55 Because Aleynikov took no media, the court echoes Bottone and concludes, "[s]ome tangible property must be taken from the owner for there to be deemed a 'good' that is 'stolen' for purposes of the NSPA." 56 Moreover, that "reading of the NSPA is confirmed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Dowling."
57 Applying Dowling's logic, if not its holding, 58 the Second Circuit therefore joins other Circuits to find theft of trade secrets outside the ambit of the NSPA.
59
The EEA conviction was reversed, too, because "Goldman's [highfrequency trading] system was neither 'produced for' nor 'placed in' interstate or foreign commerce. Goldman had no intention of selling its HFT system or licensing it to anyone." 60 It is difficult to imagine why Goldman's computer source code was not also covered by copyright. 61 It, therefore, seems remarkable that Aleynikov was not also indicted under FCA § 506(a)(1). 62 Given that the jury found Aleynikov guilty of violating the NSPA and the EEA, 63 it is hard to believe that it would not also have found that Goldman's code was taken for "private financial gain" as forbidden by § 506(a)(1)(A). If so, conviction would have warranted imprisonment for up to ten years. 64 The problem revealed by Aleynikov has since been addressed "by striking 'or included in a product that is produced for or placed in' and inserting 'a product or service used in or intended for use in'" in § 1832(a) of the EEA. 65 It is remarkable that substituted language does not read, for example, "a product or service used in or intended for a use that affects."
66 Thus, the amendment seems not to go far enough.
67
In any event, information of the type misappropriated at the Vatican could now be covered by the EEA despite its being unrelated to any product. Nor would the value threshold noted in Bottone present a problem.
68
Possibly for reasons mentioned there, 69 no value threshold appears in the EEA's definition of trade secret 70 or in sections spelling out forbidden conduct.
71 Such information would nevertheless be difficult to fit within the EEA's trade secret definition. 
III. STATE LAW A. Generally
State prosecution for copyright infringement is barred because state action to vindicate "legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright" is preempted. 73 Aleynikov's prosecution for theft under the EEA failed in part for lack of a product "produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce." 74 Despite that limitation, he could have been prosecuted under the law of several states, and, he is, in fact being prosecuted under New York state law. 75 It also warrants mention that preemptive limits on state jurisdiction have extended beyond copyrights since 1964, when a pair of cases suggested that any state's prohibition of copying unpatented goods would be preempted by federal patent laws. 76 Not until the Kewanee decision in 1974 did it become clear that state trade secret jurisdiction is not barred. 77 Indeed, as Justice Marshall writes:
Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the possibility that an inventor with a patentable invention will rely on state trade secret law rather than apply for a patent is "remote indeed. . . ." I have no doubt that the existence of trade secret protection provides in some instances a substantial disincentive to entrance into the patent system . . . . agencies.
78
Limits nevertheless remain. Perhaps the most significant is Kewanee's observation that trade secret law "does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or by so-called reverse engineering." 79 Potentially most significant is the suggestion that states could not, should they so desire, penalize someone who accidentally obtained a secret.
In support of a recommendation that appears to have led to creation of the EEA, 80 Peter Toren found that prosecuting trade secret theft to be difficult in thirty states. 81 Georgia, and Texas within the past three decades. 87 Before theft of "trade secrets" can be penalized, the term must be defined. In the context of private torts, its definition has been relatively uniform since 1939: "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." 88 As noted in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, "Some early cases elevated use by the trade secret owner to independent significance." 89 Now, however, "Use by the person asserting rights in the information is not a prerequisite to [trade secret] protection."
90 That view is also reflected in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) 91 and the EEA. 92 Most states have adopted the UTSA, 93 but nothing equivalent exists for state prosecution of theft of intangibles, even when trade secrets are referenced explicitly.
Three opinions are considered below in chronological order. They seem ample to illustrate important problems that would be faced by state courts in dealing with situations similar to those illustrated by Aleynikov, 94 or the Vatican controversy. 95 Moreover, unlike most of the few cases that have been found, 96 the highest courts in the state issued the first and third opinions. 91. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (Nat'l Conference on Uniform State Laws) (1985) (protecting information that "derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known" (emphasis added)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (defining a trade secret as "any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others" (emphasis added)).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (1996) (protects information that "derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known" (emphasis added)). But note that § 1832(a), quoted supra note 41, differs in that respect. On facts similar to those in Dowling, 98 Yourawski was prosecuted for larceny where the property in question was a motion picture on media not itself stolen. 99 Refusing to follow pre-Dowling federal opinions where such action was found within the scope of NSPA, 100 the opinion holds:
We do not read the definition of "property" in G.L. c. 266, § 30(2), as reaching the property interest that is alleged to have been stolen in this case. Certainly, the images and sounds captured on the cassette tapes are not within any of the items specified in § 30(2). We have [sic not] treated § 30(2)'s definition of property as all-inclusive, apart from items that were subject to larceny at common law. The court also points out that "the knowing receipt of stolen trade secrets" was added elsewhere in the statute in 1967. 102 It warrants mention that the court says:
In light of our conclusion that the intellectual property appearing on the cassette tapes is not property within the meaning of the definition appearing in G. In the opinions, no reference is found to anything tangible other than the notebooks, so the second count is apparently based on their being valued between $20,000 and $100,000.
109
Following repeated refusals to return the notebooks, 110 resulting in repeated revocations of probation, Taborsky was imprisoned.
111 Although he served eighteen months, 112 he might have served fifteen years, triple the penalty for theft of secrets that overwhelming comprised the value of the notebooks.
113 Dowling, for example, seems to stand for the proposition that, when two provisions might apply, the specific should prevail over the general.
114 If the Florida legislature believed that a particular penalty should apply to a given crime, why would it regard a larger penalty as appropriate 104 The facts in the final case considered here most resemble those at issue in the Vatican. 116 As the opinion recounts:
In early 2001, the defendant entered his tenants' apartment with their permission to install a ceiling fan. When the couple left, the defendant entered their bedroom and, without permission, took possession of several intimate photographs of the female tenant, which he found on top of a dresser. He brought the pictures to his nearby apartment, scanned them into his computer, and then returned them to their original location. Several months later, the tenants learned of the defendant's actions and reported the matter to the police. The defendant admitted what he had done when the police confronted him. 117 As also related in the opinion, Nelson, in his appeal following conviction for receiving stolen property, argues that "the computer-scanned photographic images generated from the original photographs are not 'property' within the meaning of the theft chapter."
118 Additionally, "[h]e further contends that the State's evidence, as a matter of law, did not establish either that the images he retained on his computer constituted 'property of another,' or that he had a 'purpose to deprive' the owner of the photographic images." 119 Rejecting Nelson's argument that holding the images on his computer did not amount to receipt of stolen property, 120 the court turns to the statutory definition of property underlying such penalties. 121 As stated there, "property" covers "anything of value, including . . . intangible personal property," as well as services, and trade secrets. 122 The court then concludes on a point highly relevant here:
Integral to ownership . . . is the right to exclude others from possessing, using and enjoying a particular item of property.
Thus, the owner of the photographs at issue had the right to select who would have access to view them. Though the defendant returned the original photographs, he kept a computer reproduction of the captured images, without permission, and it is these images he was convicted of unlawfully retaining. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law . . . . 123 Nelson's attorney did not argue that theft of such images may only be prosecuted under the FCA. 124 Indeed, had federal prosecution been attempted, the need to demonstrate that the stolen images had a retail value exceeding $1000 could have presented serious difficulty. 125 In any event, had preemption been argued, that too might have failed. Insofar as information in the photographs was apparently not intended for public viewing, it might as readily fall within the realm of trade secrets as copyrights. If so, state jurisdiction would not be defeated by federal preemption.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Since January 1, 1978, copyright in documents, published or unpublished, is exclusively a matter of federal law. 126 After Dowling, 127 federal prosecutions based on generic penal statutes seem unlikely except for theft of media that happens to contain copyrighted subject matter. 128 Nor, in the latter instance, would anything seem to bar state prosecution. 129 Since 1996, federal prosecution for theft of trade secrets has been possible under the EEA. 130 As mentioned above, the facts of Aleynikov 131 illustrate how prosecution under that act could easily overlap with prosecution under the FCA. 132 Why the latter was not pursued is a mystery. 133 In any event, prosecution under both the NSPA and the EEA failed because no goods were involved. 134 The latter failure appears to have resulted from an inadvertent legislative gap apt now closed. 135 States clearly may prosecute those who steal goods, 136 but prosecution for theft of intangibles has long been based on an assortment of statutes, 137 at least one of which is preempted. 138 Published copyrightable subject matter is beyond the reach of state law, civil or penal, but little other than individual state's statutory limits 139 prevents the theft of unpublished information that might qualify as a trade secret. 140 Roughly half of the states penalize theft of trade secrets specifically, 141 but those that do offer definitions may be difficult to reconcile with intangible property such as was stolen in the Vatican case. 142 With regard to that, one opinion finds, "at least some precedent for granting trade secret status to works that are techniques for improving oneself (though not specifically spiritually). Conversely, there is no authority for excluding religious materials from trade secret protection because of their nature." 143 That opinion, however, concerns a civil dispute, giving cause to wonder whether courts would resolve the issue the same way in a criminal case. 144 Many states penalize theft of "intangible personal property," 145 but no state definitions of that term have been found. 146 What might it cover other than information akin to trade secrets, possibly including non-economic as well as economic interests? Must it be alienable? Does it include domain names that are alienable? 147 Does it include trademark-related interests alienable but only when included with the sale of a related business? 148 What of rights of publicity? 149 In that respect, the facts in Nelson 150 press the limits of intangible property interests subject to state penal control. One might wonder how the New Hampshire court might have responded if copyright preemption been called to its attention. 151 It seems even more of a stretch than with some religious documents 152 to regard the contents of the photographs in issue as "trade secrets." 153 Privacy seems to have been the victim's central interest in Nelson, 154 and possibly also in the Vatican case. 155 It seems highly inappropriate to regard an invasion of privacy as theft of property.
156
Such issues seem ripe for careful legislative attention. Having that in mind, courts should consider such matters as whether a legislature would set, for whatever reason, the penalty for theft of trade secrets at five years, if it intended that the simultaneous theft of otherwise valueless media would warrant a fifteen year sentence. This paper only scratches the surface, but it should support the ultimate conclusion that much remains to be done at the state level if penalties are to be imposed, as well they should be, for crimes involving trade secrets and other intangible property.
158 If, as this author expects, it would foster better understanding and bring more state resources to bear on increasingly important criminal activity 159 something in the nature of a penal UTSA might result in more state prosecutions. 160 The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment. (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820)). 158. See Winfield, supra note 2. 159. See Yang, supra note 85 ("[T]he FBI says its pending caseload of espionage cases represents losses to the American economy of more than $13 billion this fiscal year."). It seems likely that many cases are too small to warrant federal attention. 160. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 857(9).
